There have been increasing concerns about the potential of larger banks acquiring community banks and the declining number of community banks, which would significantly reduce small business lending (SBL) and disrupt relationship lending. This paper examines the roles and characteristics of U.S. community banks in the past decade, covering the recent economic boom and downturn. We analyze risk characteristics (including the confidential ratings assigned by bank regulators) of acquired community banks, compare pre-and post-acquisition performance and stock market reactions to these acquisitions, and investigate how the acquisitions have affected SBL. Contrary to concerns, we find that the overall amount of SBL tends to increase after a large bank acquires a community bank. The ratio of SBL to assets does decline in the large acquiring banks but at a slower rate than the decline seen in surviving community banks. Further, community banks that were merged during the financial crisis were mostly in poor financial condition, had been rated as unsatisfactory by their regulators on all risk aspects, and would have been unlikely to continue lending. We found that community bank targets accepted smaller merger premiums (or even discounts) to be part of a large banking organization. Our results indicate that mergers involving community bank targets over the past decade have enhanced the overall safety and soundness of the banking system without adversely impacting SBL. This implies that a policy that discourages mergers between community banks and large banks is unwarranted and could potentially result in a weaker financial system and have an unintentional dampening effect on the supply of SBL.
I. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of problem While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has focused mostly on large TBTF banks, there have been fears among small community banks that they might also be affected and that the new rules might inhibit their ability to lend in their local communities because of the increased costs of such lending. 3 For these reasons, some commentators believe that many of the community banks have been seeking to merge or to be acquired by a larger bank in order to take advantage of the scale economies under the new regulations. 4 Should community banks be encouraged to merge? Would acquisitions of community banks by large banks result in a significant reduction in SBL in local communities and destroy relationship lending?
1 Source: FDIC Report 2 For example, JPMorgan Chase & Co. reported profit growth of 31 percent per share in the second quarter of 2013, Goldman Sachs's profit also more than doubled in the second quarter of 2013 compared with the year before, and Bank of America reported a 65 percent increase in profit during the same period. 3 This concern holds despite the recent efforts to impose less complex requirements for small banks, such as the Volcker Rule, which was approved by the Senate in December 2013. 4 In December 2013, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors released a paper on designing a federal regulatory framework for community banks. The group has argued that the rulemaking since the financial crisis has undermined the smaller lenders' ability to provide credit tailored to consumers and small businesses. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors (2013) for more details.
Our objective is to examine the impact of small community bank acquisitions by large banks on SBL over the past decade, covering both the boom and the recent downturns. The measures of performance and risk characteristics used in this study include the change in the confidential supervisory ratings (CAMELS) before and after the mergers; how the banks perform in terms of risk-taking, efficiency, liquidity, capitalization, and profitability; and how they are perceived by the market. We use the data on mergers and acquisitions that involved community banks during the period from 2000 to 2012 to examine the risk characteristics of the targets and acquirers at the time of the mergers, to track postmerger performance of the combined banking firm, and to investigate whether the mergers have affected the banks' SBL.
Finally, we observe how the stock markets react to the community bank merger announcement, during both the boom and the financial crisis.
We find that community bank mergers that took place during the recent financial crisis are much different than those mergers that occurred in earlier periods (examined in previous studies). We find that mergers of community banks with other (healthier) banks have resulted in combined banking firms that are healthier financially and more efficient in their operations.
Controlling for the risk characteristics of the targets and their acquirers and for economic factors, we find that overall SBL tends to increase when the acquirer is a large bank (with assets of more than $10 billion). Overall, mergers that involved community bank targets have so far enhanced the safety and soundness of the banking system and have done so without hurting SBL, as large banks have come in to substitute and fill the SBL gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses existing literature related to the special role of community banks in relationship lending and those related to the impact of community bank mergers on credit availability to small businesses. Section III describes the data sources and provides a statistical overview of the changes in the U.S.
community banking industry since the year 2000. Section IV explores the risk characteristics of the targets, the acquiring banks, and the combined banking firms for all the mergers that involved community bank targets since the year 2000 -and shows that community banks have become stronger through the mergers and acquisitions. Section V investigates the evolving role of community banks in SBL over the 2000-2012 period by exploring SBL market shares at large versus community banks, and how SBL may have been affected by community bank mergers.
Section VI examines merger deal premiums and stock market reactions in all mergers that involved community bank targets during 2000-2012. Finally, concluding remarks and policy implications are presented in Section VII.
II. Literature Review and Our Contribution
About 93 percent of all U.S. banks are community banks with total assets of less than $1 billion. These banks altogether, however, account for only about 10 percent of U.S. banking assets (see Table 1 for more details). This may be why research that focuses on community banks has been relatively scarce despite concerns about the impact of the recent recession on this sector and the related policy considerations. We will focus on studies on community bank mergers and the role of community banks in SBL.
Role of Community Banks in SBL:
The existing literature on the role of community banks in SBL has so far presented mixed results. Using merger data from 1991 to 2006, Beccalli and Frantz (2013) examine important determinants for banks to become involved as either a target or an acquirer in a merger. While the paper focuses primarily on methodological approaches -multinomial logistic versus Cox regression -they find that banks that are likely to become a target of a bank merger tend to be cost and profit inefficient, less liquid, and less capitalized.
They also find that the acquiring banks tend to be well diversified and well managed, where managers leverage their profits and pursue higher growth strategies. Banks that acquire other banks multiple times (involved in multiple merger deals rather a single deal) tend to be larger banks. The results from Beccalli and Frantz (2013) imply that the acquirers of community banks are likely to be larger banks, thus causing concerns that the combined banking firm would be too large to look beyond credit scores and other model-based metrics in its lending decision and too large to maintain the direct personal knowledge of the local economy that has enabled community banks to tailor products and services to meet community needs. Kowalik (2013) examines how competition from large banks, which have lower funding costs, affects small banks' ability to attract and maintain their borrowers. Small community banks have advantages in monitoring their customers through personal relationships, and they have an important role to play in monitoring and enhancing the project value for intermediate quality borrowers whose true quality may not be reflected in the public reports. The paper argues that small banks can be viable competitors of large banks and can add value to the borrowers' projects when the true value cannot be easily observed by large banks. This finding is consistent with the conventional paradigm, which suggests that, unlike large banks that serve large transparent firms, small community banks have their special role in supporting small businesses in their local communities, as they are better able to form strong relationships with small opaque firms.
Other papers, however, seem to suggest the opposite findings. For example, Berger and Udell (2006) examine lending to small and medium-size enterprises (SME) using a more complete framework that allows the presence of alternative lending technologies. They conclude against some previous findings -that large banks have a comparative advantage in transaction-based lending technologies and that a comparative disadvantage in relationship lending does not necessarily imply that large banks are disadvantaged in providing credit to informationally opaque SMEs. They also add that some transaction-based lending technologies used by large banks are actually well suited for funding opaque SMEs. Further, previous findings may be driven by the differences between the U.S. structure and that of other nations.
Small bank presence may be more important in other nations because their financial structures may limit their use of some lending technologies available in the U.S.
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In addition, using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, Berger, Goulding, and Rice (2014) examine the type of bank serving as the main relationship bank for small businesses, controlling for risk characteristics of the firm and those of the owner. They also find results that are not consistent with the conventional paradigm.
Interestingly, Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005) find that small business credit score (SBCS) plays an important role in SBL, as it reduces lending costs and allows for a net increase in lending to "marginal borrowers." Further, the SBCS has allowed some large banks to expand their lending to at least some pools of small business customers -therefore, this technology has allowed larger banks to increase their role in lending to small businesses. Berger, Cerqueiro, and Penas (2014) Using data from older 1994 to 2000 and focusing on the role of community banks in SBL lending, Avery and Samolyk (2004) examine how bank mergers affected SBL in local markets.
They find that while large bank mergers are associated with slower loan growth in the local area, community bank mergers are associated with higher loan growth and greater market share of SBL funded by community banks. This is consistent with Jagtiani (2008) and sheds light on the source of increased SBL by community banks in the local area, since Jagtiani (2008) does not examine reactions by other community banks in the local area in response to a community bank merger. Avery and Samolyk (2004) take into account these reactions and conclude that other community banks in the area react to mergers by making more SBL.
Berger, Scalise, Saunders, and Udell (1998) also found that other banks in the area had strong SBL reactions to bank mergers, as the size distribution of banks in the local market change. They investigate the "static" versus the "dynamic" effects of bank mergers on SBL.
They find that while the static effects (associated with scale and strategy due to reduced efficiency in relationship lending as the banks merge into a larger bank) resulted in a reduction in SBL, the dynamic effects (associated with postmerger impact and reactions by other local banks) resulted in increased SBL by other banking firms in the local area. Overall, they conclude that the static effects that reduce SBL are more than offset by the reactions of other local banks so that the net impact of bank mergers results in increased SBL.
In addition to increased SBL from other nonmerged banks in the same local area, Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (2004) found that de novo banks spring up and start engaging in SBL in markets in which there are mergers. Goldberg and White (1998) and DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) find that new banks tend to make more relationship loans and that the amount of relationship lending declines as banks age (up to 20 years old). In response to community bank mergers, de novo banks tend to be formed to fill the SBL gap as small local banks disappear through mergers.
Overall, the literature suggests that there are many factors that impact the amount and growth in SBL. Bank consolidation and reaction by other banks to local bank mergers could impact SBL. Besides mergers and acquisitions, changes in market environment and regulations could play an important role. The recent financial crisis has brought about one of the largest changes in the history of banking regulations, resulting in dramatic changes in the behaviors of both borrowers and banking firms. Our paper reexamines community bank mergers and SBL, using more recent data.
III. Community Banking Overview
Our data come from various sources. All the information related to the mergers, target characteristics, and the acquirer characteristics come from the SNL Financial database. Data The U.S. banking industry is unique in that while more than 90 percent of about 7,000 U.S. banks are small community banks (with less than $1 billion in assets), more than 90 percent of the U.S. banking assets are held at large banking institutions. 6 The community banking sector has also been shrinking over time, both in terms of the number of community banks and the amount of assets controlled by community banks (Table 1 ).
There has also been a long-term, steady trend of merger and acquisition activity involving community banks. Overall, the number of large banks has been growing significantly in the past decade, while there has been a substantial decline in the number of community banks. More than 90 percent of all bank merger transactions that took place during 2000 to 2012 involved community bank targets. However, this number translates to only about 10 percent in terms of all targets' banking assets (Table 2 ).
There have been concerns that attrition of the community banking sector may be adversely affecting SBL and that acquisition of small banks by large banking institutions would disrupt relationship lending. The general perception seems to be that the observed decline in the number of community banks in the past decade may not result in much impact on SBL if the acquirers have been community banks themselves (rather than large banks). Table 3 shows that community banks have been acquired mostly by other community banks throughout the study period, especially during the period after the recent financial crisis began. In addition to the acquirers' asset size, there also have been concerns that if the acquiring banks are headquartered in another state, the funding from the local community may be lost to out-ofstate borrowers. Table 4 shows that this has not been the case. Community bank mergers (mergers between the community bank target and the community bank acquirer) have mostly been within the same state (in-state mergers).
Overall, since most of the community bank mergers involved community bank acquirers and were mostly in-state mergers, the mergers should not have reduced lending to small businesses and/or moved funds out of the community. In fact, community bank mergers that took place in the past decade should have strengthened the banks' comparative advantage in relationship lending. The next sections further examine how community bank mergers have affected their risk characteristics and their roles as relationship lenders to small businesses.
IV. Have Community Banks Become Stronger or Weaker After the Mergers?
We explore important characteristics of targets and acquirers around the mergers' announcement dates and compare those with characteristics of the combined firm after the mergers. Figures 1.1 to 1.7 present the comparison of premerger and postmerger performance based on the various components of the confidential supervisory ratings (i.e., the capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management quality (M), earnings (E), liquidity (L), sensitivity to market (S), and the composite rating (CAMELS), respectively). 7 The sample includes all mergers that involved community banks during the period from 2000 to 2012. The plots compare average ratings across all the mergers that were announced in each year from that period.
Note that the lowest rating (1) represents the best rating, and the highest rating (5) is the worst. The premerger ratings for targets and acquirers are the latest assigned ratings prior to the merger announcement date. The postmerger ratings are the first assigned rating after the merger has been completed. 8 Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi (2014) find that different regulators may be applying different standards when assigning the CAMELS ratings. The discrepancy is related to different weights given to local economic conditions.
Based on the average supervisory ratings prior to the mergers, the community bank targets are clearly weaker than the acquirers, particularly for mergers that took place during the financial crisis period or later (2008 and thereafter) when the targets' ratings were below satisfactory (3 rating), on average. The ratings of the combined firm (after the merger) are much improved compared with those of the targets prior to the mergers. These results are consistent across all component ratings and the composite CAMELS rating.
Overall, community banks that were acquired during the financial crisis had performed poorly and, on average, were rated unsatisfactory by their regulators on all risk aspects. 9 These banks would not have been able to serve as a good funding source for small businesses anyway, and, in fact, they were more likely to fail if they were not acquired by another (healthier) bank.
Overall, these mergers actually served to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking system, 10 suggesting that there are no good reasons to be overly concerned about the large number of community bank mergers so far.
While our analysis here does not control for the regulators (federal versus state regulators) that assigned the ratings, we do control for economic conditions around the merger date. 9 These community bank targets were undercapitalized, holding poor-quality assets on the balance sheet, not well managed, not profitable, less liquid, and more exposed to greater market risks. 10 Our finding is consistent with Cooper and Vermilyea (2012) , who find that mergers that involved a well-managed acquiring bank (with a superior M rating) could improve the long-term performance of the combined banking firm after the merger. 
V. Funding Availability for Small Businesses
The conventional wisdom is that small local community banks make loans based on relationships and other qualitative information (rather than the typical model-based risk score 11 The targets were not profitable (smaller ROE or larger losses), were less efficient in their operations, had more bad loans (more charge-offs), and were less capitalized. the average SBL-to-assets ratio has declined more sharply for the surviving community banks than the larger banks.
12 Data on SBL and assets are obtained from the year-end quarterly Call Reports, and the sample includes all banks (the entire market) in the U.S. 13 The increased market share in SBL at large banks is partly due to their becoming more active in SBL and partly due to the fact that large banks became larger in this period. 1-Jan-01 1-Jan-02 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-04 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-06 1-Jan-07 1-Jan-08 1-Jan-09 1-Jan-10 1-Jan-11 1-Jan-12 1-Jan-02 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-04 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-06 1-Jan-07 1-Jan-08 1-Jan-09 1-Jan-10 1-Jan-11 1-Jan-12 show that the targets were more committed than the acquirers prior to the mergers. 16 We also find that after the mergers, SBL for the combined firms (as of one year and two years after the completion of the mergers) tends to follow the acquirers' patterns.
The overall results so far suggest that while the U.S. banking industry has been expanding rapidly in the past decade, the share of SBL to banking assets has become significantly smaller now than it was over a decade ago (Figure 3 .2). Following overall industry trends, the ratio of SBL to assets has declined for all bank size groups, regardless of whether they were involved in mergers and acquisitions (Figures 3.3 to 3.5). Interestingly, the decline in the SBL ratio has been more severe at community banks than at larger banks. Large banks have also been playing an increasing role in providing funding to small businesses in terms of SBL volume and market share (Figure 3 .1).
Regression Analysis -Community Bank Mergers and SBL:
To further understand the impact of community bank mergers on SBL, we perform a regression analysis in which we control for the characteristics of the targets and the acquirers and the SBL trend for similar banks (in the same size category and geographic location). The samples include all mergers that 15 For Figures 3.3 to 3 .5, the data on SBL and assets are obtained from the year-end quarterly Call Reports. The sample includes all mergers announced from 2000 to 2012 that involved community banks (targets being less than $1 billion in assets). The data are from the SNL database. 16 Figure 3 .5 presents similar information to that in Figure 3 .4 except that the amount of lending includes both the regular (nonfarm) SBL as well as farm SBL.
involved community banks during the period from 2000 to 2012. The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 5 .
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Dependent variables are measured in two different ways. First, we use the total increased dollar amount (not adjusted for inflation) of SBL due to the mergers -estimated as the combined firm's total SBL after the merger minus the combined total SBL (the target and the acquirer) prior to the merger. The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 .
Second, we use the change in the ratio of SBL to assets for the combined (merged) banking firm as compared with premerger. The premerger ratio is the combined SBL of the target and the acquirer divided by the combined total assets of the target and the acquirer before the merger.
The results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 .
Independent variables include risk characteristics as reflected in the CAMELS ratings for
the targets and the acquirers prior to the merger in which the supervisory ratings have values ranging from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). We also include dummy indicators for the size category (less than $1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and larger than $10 billion) of the acquiring banks, where the community bank acquirers, with assets of $1 billion or less, are included in the analysis as the base case.
In addition, we control for the interaction between economic factors (such as the boom period indicator) and asset size of the combined firm (by size category, with assets being less than $1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and larger than $10 billion), where the boom 17 When CAMELS data are included in the analysis, the number of observations drops significantly. However, the sample distribution across bank size groups remains roughly the same for both the original (full) sample and the reduced sample (with no missing CAMELS). For acquirers, in the full sample, 27 percent of the banks are in the $1 billion to $10 billion range, 10 percent are in the more than $10 billion range, and the rest are in the less than $1 billion range. The numbers change only slightly to 25 percent in the $1 billion to $10 billion range and 6 percent in the larger than $10 billion range for the reduced sample, which is used for the regression analysis (with no missing CAMELS).
period is defined as the years from 2004 to 2007. This is intended to capture the varying economic impact on SBL for the various size groups. Further, we control for whether the merger is an assisted merger in which the target was failing. For this, we include a dummy indicator for mergers that involved targets that were rated 4 or 5 (unsatisfactory) by their supervisors.
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Controlling for the Overall SBL Market Trends: We control for the overall market trend of SBL around the time of the merger announcement -to account for the SBL activities at banks that did not merge and to account for the varying SBL activities both in tough economic cycles (through time) and across banks. Specifically, this SBL market trend variable is included to separate the change in SBL after mergers that may have been driven by factors other than the merger, such as changes in SBL activities due to changes in the economic environment, changes in demand and supply of SBL, regulatory changes, etc. The trend variable is calculated for each observation, and it is defined as a percentage change in the overall SBL by all banks (regardless of whether they merged) that are in the same size class as the combined merged firm, in which the SBL change is measured over the same period based on the merged banking firm's merger date.
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From columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 , controlling for all the risk characteristics of the targets and the acquirers and economic factors as described earlier, the combined banking firms tend to increase their overall SBL by a larger amount when the acquiring bank is very large (with more than $10 billion in assets). This is reflected in the significantly positive coefficients of the dummy indicator D_Largest_Acquirer_>$10Bill. In addition, the coefficient of the interactive term D_Boom (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) *D_Largest is also significantly positive, indicating that the increase in the SBL amount (when the acquirers are in the largest size group) is even larger for those mergers that took place during the boom period from 2004 to 2007. We find no significant change in the SBL volume when the acquiring banks are either small community banks or medium size (with assets less than $10 billion), after controlling for the risk characteristics, economic conditions, and market trends.
When focusing on the change in ratio of SBL to assets, rather than the change in dollar amount of SBL, the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show that the SBL ratio tends to decline after the mergers when the acquiring banks are the largest or medium-size banks (larger than $10 billion in assets), as reflected in the significantly negative coefficients of D_Large Acquirer_$1Bill to $10Bill and D_Largest Acquirer_>$10Bill. This is likely due to the fact that these large acquiring institutions tend to grow more aggressively such that the overall assets growth exceeds that of SBL. 20 Nonetheless, the decline in the SBL ratio at large banks overall is not as severe as that of the surviving community banks, as shown earlier in Figure 3 .2.
We also control for failing targets, with the composite CAMELS rating being unsatisfactory (rated 4 or 5) -the coefficients are consistently insignificant.
The SBL trend variable in Table 6 , TREND_SBL Change_Size Group, is the average change in the SBL ratio by all banks in the same size class around the merger announcement date, 20 Appendix 1 presents the plots of changes in SBL for the groups of merged banks compared with all other banks (merged and nonmerged banks combined) in the same size group. We find that changes in the SBL ratio due to mergers (that involved community bank targets) seem to be unrelated (or negatively correlated) to the overall SBL market trend (for the same size class).
regardless of whether they were involved in any merger transactions. The coefficients of this SBL trend factor are significantly negative in column 2 (change in SBL volume) but insignificant in column 4 (change in SBL ratio). Other control factors in Table 6 are the composite supervisory ratings of the targets and the acquiring banks. They are generally not significantly important in determining the change in SBL after the mergers -with only one exception (in column 3) where it is weakly significantly positive at the 10 percent level, suggesting that the SBL ratio may rise for mergers that involve poorly rated acquiring banks.
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The regression results confirm our previous findings that SBL activities, on average, change significantly after the mergers. Specifically, SBL volume increases more when the acquirers of community bank targets are large banks (larger than $10 billion). The change in SBL is smaller for large acquirers than community bank acquirers, however, when considering changes in SBL ratio (rather than volume). These results hold even after controlling for important risk characteristics of the targets and acquirers, economic conditions, size-related factors, and market trends.
As mentioned earlier, SBL ratio for the industry overall actually declines more for community banks than large banks, on average, over the recent years (Figure 3 .2). In addition, the roles of large banks in supporting small businesses have become increasingly important in recent years with greater SBL market shares (Figure 3 .1). The smaller SBL ratio to assets at large banks suggests that the growth in loan demand for small business seems to be slower than that of the overall banking assets in recent years.
VI. Merger Deal Premiums and Stock Market Reactions
Merger Deal Premiums: This section examines the merger deal premiums that acquirers are willing to pay to acquire a community bank target. We perform a regression analysis, with the dependent variable being the merger deal premiums, which are calculated as a ratio of price per share paid by the acquirer divided by the market price per share of the target, based on the target's share price as of the day before the merger announcement date. The data on mergers and share prices are obtained from the SNL database and Yahoo Finance.
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The analysis controls for the various risk characteristics of the targets and the acquirers, including the ROE, efficiency ratio (the ratio of noninterest expense to the sum of net interest income and other income), nonperforming loans (NPLs), capital adequacy, asset size of the acquiring banks, market to book ratio, and an indicator for in-state mergers. The acquirer's size indicators are calculated with inflation adjusted. All the risk characteristics are measured as of the merger announcement date -calculated as the ratio of the acquirer's characteristic to the target's characteristic. The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the acquirer's market-to-book ratio to the target's market-to-book ratio. The results are presented in Table 7 .
The results indicate that merger premiums are smaller when the acquiring banks are very large banks (with assets greater than $10 billion). The community bank targets were willing to accept a smaller premium (or even a discount) to become a part of a large banking organization -probably because large banks have greater ability to diversify, to obtain scale and scope economies, and to better manage their operations. In addition, higher growth 22 Our analysis in this section includes a much smaller number of observations because most of the community banks that were involved in the mergers were not publicly traded; thus, their market share prices were not available.
acquirers (compared with the target), as measured by the ratio of market to book of the acquirer and the target, are willing to pay more to acquire the community bank target.
Stock Market Reactions:
Based on the subset data of community bank mergers that involved publicly traded community bank targets, we examine how the stock market reacts to the mergers, controlling for the various risk characteristics of the acquirers and the targets. We perform a regression analysis with the dependent variable being cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the merger announcement date (window -3 days to +3 days around the announcement date). 23 The abnormal returns are calculated based on an index of the 25 largest financial institutions, following the methodology used for the abnormal returns calculation in Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) . Again, we control for the relative acquirerto-target ratios for ROE, efficiency ratio, NPLs, and capital-to-assets ratio. The risk factors are measured as of the merger's announcement date. Relative asset size is the ratio of the target's assets to the acquirer's assets. The acquirer's size indicators are inflation adjusted. The merger deal premium variable is the price per share that the acquirer paid to acquire the target divided by the market price per share of the target (source: SNL database and Yahoo Finance). A dummy indicator for low trading volume is also included to indicate that the bank's stocks were traded with an average of less than 1,000 shares daily for the period in which the market model is fitted. The results are presented in Table 8 .
After controlling for the risk characteristics of both the targets and the acquirers, the results suggest that the stock market's perception about these community bank mergers seems to be determined by the merger deal premiums (i.e., the premiums that the acquirers are willing to pay over the target's market price per share). The larger the premiums that the acquiring banks are willing to pay to acquire the community bank target, the larger the positive abnormal returns around the merger announcement date. Given that the deal premiums that acquirers are willing to pay are proxies for the synergies to be obtained from the mergers, the results are consistent with an argument that the market reacts more positively to the mergers that are expected to produce greater synergies.
VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications
There have been growing concerns about the potential of the decline in the number of community banks and the increasing number of acquisitions of community banks by larger banks -to disrupt local relationships and significantly reduce SBL.
In this paper, we examine the roles and characteristics of U.S. community banks in the past decade, covering both the boom period and the subsequent downturn. We compare the pre-and post-merger performance and risk characteristics (including the confidential ratings assigned by bank regulators), investigate whether the mergers have affected SBL, and observe how the stock markets react to community bank mergers. We also explore whether large banks have been able and willing to step in and substitute for community banks in providing funding to small businesses.
We show that large banks have been getting larger and that the number of small banks has been declining over the past two decades. However, from 2000 to 2012, as the number of community banks has declined, we have found that the overall SBL market share for the largest banks (more than $100 billion) has more than doubled; thereby indicating that large banks have been stepping in to fill the gap.
Our regression analysis, controlling for risk characteristics of the targets and the acquirers, economic factors, and market trends, finds that the amount of SBL by acquiring banks tends to increase from the pre-acquisition base when the acquirer is a large bank (with assets of more than $10 billion), indicating that the large bank acquirers do grow SBL.
When examining SBL activities in terms of the average SBL-to-total-asset ratio, the data show that the SBL-to-assets ratio has declined (over the same period from 2001 to 2012) for all bank size groups, including the community banks themselves. But the rate of decline among large banks has been lower than that of community banks.
We find that community banks that were merged during the financial crisis period performed poorly and were often rated unsatisfactory by their regulators on all risk aspects.
These community bank targets were undercapitalized, held poor quality and less liquid assets on their balance sheet, were not profitable, and were not well managed. Our results overall indicate that mergers of community bank targets with healthier banks have resulted in combined banking firms that are healthier financially and more efficient in their operations.
Overall, mergers that involved community bank targets have so far enhanced the safety and soundness of the banking system.
Among all community bank mergers that involved publicly traded targets, we find that the merger premiums are smaller when the acquiring banks are large banks (with total assets greater than $10 billion). This suggests that community bank targets may see an advantage in becoming a part of large banking organizations and therefore may be willing to accept smaller premiums (or even discounts).
Based on the above, we conclude that the trend of acquisitions of community banks by large banks over the past decade has enhanced the overall safety and soundness of the banking system, without adversely impacting SBL, as large banks have stepped in and grown their local lending. 24 This implies that a policy that discourages mergers between community banks and large banks is unwarranted and could potentially result in a weaker financial system and have an unintentional dampening effect on the supply of SBL lending. Note:  It is shown above that both the total number of community banks (with total assets less than $1 billion) and their share of banking assets have declined significantly in the past decade. It should also be noted that most of the decline has been driven by very small community banks with assets less than $100 million. As expected, banks in all asset categories have become larger over time.  The share of U.S. banking assets has shifted significantly from small community banks to larger banks. Community banks held 18.4 percent of U.S. banking assets in 2001; that number fell to 9.7 percent in 2012. The share of U.S. banking assets (inflation adjusted) at the largest banks almost doubled during the same period.  This table shows that community banks have been acquired mostly by other community banks throughout the study period, especially during the period after the recent financial crisis had begun. Table 6 Small Business Lending Regressions
The samples include all mergers that involved community banks during the period from 2000 to 2012. Supervisory ratings have a value of 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Community bank acquirers (with assets up to $1 billion) are included in the analysis as the base case. The increase in SBL (includes both farm and nonfarm SBL) due to mergers is calculated as the difference (not adjusted for inflation) between SBL by the combined firm after the merger and the combined SBL of the target and the acquirer prior to the merger. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The significance levels are calculated with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, where ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The merger deal premiums are calculated based on the target's share price as of one day before the merger announcement date. The acquirer's size indicators are inflation adjusted. The merger deal premium is the price per share that the acquirer paid to acquire the target divided by market price per share of the target (sources: SNL database and Yahoo Finance). All the risk characteristics (ROE, efficiency ratio, NPLs, capital-to-assets ratio, market-to-book ratio) are measured as of the merger's announcement date -acquirer-to-target ratio. The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the acquirer's market-to-book ratio to the target's market-to-book ratio. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The significance levels are calculated with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, where ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Independent

Model
(1) (4) The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated for the window (-3, +3) around the merger announcement date, based on an index of the 25 largest financial institutions. Relative asset size is the ratio of the target's assets to the acquirer's assets. The acquirer's size indicators are inflation adjusted. The merger deal premium is the price per share that the acquirer paid to acquire the target divided by the market price per share of the target (sources: SNL database and Yahoo Finance). All the risk characteristics (ROE, efficiency ratio, NPLs, capital-to-assets ratio) are measured as of the merger's announcement date -acquirer-to-target ratio. The dummy indicator for low trading volume indicates that the bank's stocks were traded with an average of less than 1,000 shares daily for the period in which the market model is fit. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The significance levels are calculated with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, where ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) 
Appendix 1
The plots in this appendix illustrate the one-year and two-year changes in small business lending (SBL) during the periods one-year and two-years following the merger dates. The goal is to compare the changes in SBL at merged banks (our sample banks) with the overall market (all banks in the U.S.) -to explore whether the SBL changes following the mergers were driven by the mergers or simply reflect the changes in market conditions.
A separate analysis was performed for each size groups, resulting in three plots below. The banks are grouped by the asset size of the combined entity postmerger (for the sampled merged banks) and by asset size of each individual bank in the market (for nonmerged banks). Data are from the SNL financial database and the Federal Reserve Call Report (June) data.
The results from these figures indicate that SBL at sampled merged banks tends to move largely independently of the overall SBL in the same time period. What we observe from these plots is consistent with the regression results in Table 6 , which indicate that SBL at merged banks in our sample tended to, on average, move in the opposite direction of the market. The results could also imply that banks that acquire community banks, as a size class, tend to be different from banks that generally make up the market (nonmerged banks) in terms of their SBL. 
